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In this paper we analyze the dynamics of labor markets in Chile. Our goal is to 
understand how flexibility in the labor market has changed over time, and in 
particular, to relate this change with the legislation framework. Using transition 
probabilities we analyze mobility in five periods, each of them associated with 
different labor regimes. Based on flows, we estimate transition probabilities across 
three relevant possible states: unemployment, employment, and out of the labor 
force. 
 
Our finding shows that since 1974 employment became less secure. The probability 
for an employed person of becoming unemployed almost doubled since 1974 and 
remained thereafter, but reached its peak in the period 1999-2003. Also, the 
probability of remaining unemployed increased from 25.9% in the period 1962-73, to 
over 40% in the periods 1974-79 and 1980-89, but felt to 16.6% in the period 1991-
98, to jump again to 40.6% after 1999.  
 
We also found that the natural rate of unemployment more than doubled after the 
reforms in 1974 and remained high, until the period 1991-98. However, the natural 
rate of unemployment rose to almost 6% after 1999. We found no evidence of 
discouraged and added worker effects to explain the increase in the unemployment 
rate in the last period studied. 
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1. Introduction 
The study of the Chilean labor markets offers significant interest due to at least three 
reasons. First, Chile from being a highly regulated economy, become one of the most open 
unregulated economies in the world by implementing deep economics reforms in most 
institutions, including the pension system and the labor markets. Second, Chile has 
relatively good historical data, which allows economic and statistical analysis that is not 
possible in most LDCs. Third, the performance of the labor markets in Chile has been 
puzzling. The jump in the unemployment rate in the middle seventies, when the 
government carried out a first group of structural reforms, was not reversed despite to the 
rapid growth of the economy in the last part of that decade. On the other hand, in the 
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  1eighties, after a much deeper crisis that lead the unemployment  rate to over 25%, the 
recovery in the employment, the reduction in the unemployment and the growth in wages 
was much more rapid than expected.  
 
Unfortunately, panel data, based on the follow-up of a sample of people (or any other unit 
of study) across time, is not available form a historical perspective, so only indirect 
approaches have been carried out.
2 Studying the labor markets dynamics is crucial not only 
to understand the development process and the perspective of the economy, but also to 
understand the meaning of some indicators captured through surveys in a particular period. 
For instance, two economies could be facing the same unemployment rate affecting one 
twelve of the labor force (8.6%), but each of them, present a complete different situation 
regarding the severity of the unemployment. Thus, economy 1 may have that 
unemployment rate because each person who belongs to the labor force is unemployed 
during one month per year, that is, one twelfth of the year. Economy 2, on the other hand, 
could have the same unemployment rate because one twelve of their labor force is 
permanently unemployed. The other eleven twelfth is permanently employed.   
 
As it becomes apparent, in the first economy the unemployment situation is simple, there is 
little if any social problem with unemployment. In the second case, the situation is 
extremely painful for 8.6% of the labor force. Furthermore, each economy offers a very 
different likelihood of giving employment for the unemployed. Consequently, each 
economy requires different policy measures.  
  
As clearly derived from this example, studying the dynamic properties of the economy is 
critical for policy proposals. In this paper we perform a dynamic analysis to analyze 
whether the increase in legal flexibility in the labor markets in Chile has affected real 
flexibility. To do so, we analyze mobility in different periods associated with different 
labor regulations: 1960 - 1973; 1974 - 1979; 1980 - 1990; 1991 - 1998, and 1999 - 2003. 
Within each period, labor laws and other institutional arrangements were fairly stable, but 
the end of each period marks the beginning of a new institutional framework, that is, a set 
of policies and laws directed at altering the performance of the labor market. For this 
purpose, the paper estimates transition probabilities across three possible states: 
unemployment, employment, and out of the labor force and we associate flexibility with the 
size of these transition probabilities. 
 
The paper has three sections besides this one. In section 2 we describe the Chilean economy 
during the period 1960-2003. Section 3 presents the methodology to compute transition 
probabilities and the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The Chilean Economy and the Labor Market 
The great depression was probably the most important conditioning factor that determined 
the roles that the State and other sectors and entities would play in the economy over the next 
forty years. In particular, the strong State intervention the country began to experience, as in 
most Latin American countries, started in 1930. Prior to 1973, the Chilean labor law was 
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  2very protective. Only one union per firm was allowed and membership to a union was 
mandatory. Strikes had no limit and replacement was forbidden.  Dismissal of workers was 
very difficult until 1966, when a law prohibited dismissals without a justified reason. As 
many other restrictions applied, as to be registered member of specific unions to work in 
some activities, the public sector, where wages could only increase in real terms, was a 
main generator of employment.
3 In the private sector wages were closely determined by the 
regulation, including minimum wages and adjustment clauses. The state intervention, 
including that on labor, reached its peak in the early seventies during the Allende 
administration. In 1970, when Allende took office, there were 75 State-owned enterprises; by 
1973, there were more than 200, accounting for 39% of the GDP.  
 
Consistent with these institutions, employment growth in the 1960's followed the path of the 
economy. While relatively low employment product elasticity before the 1970's existed, the 
unemployment rate remained relatively low due to the increasing schooling rate and a lower 
labor market participation, and due to the progressive involvement of the government as an 
employer. The main changes in institutions and performance appeared after 1973, due to the 
political and economic crisis that had almost paralyzed the country. Thus, in September 1973, 
in the throes of that crisis, a military regime overthrew Allende. The Military Junta limited 
civil rights, banned unions and political parties and initiated a process of structural 
adjustment and reforms.  
 
Although in 1973 the economy was beset by many microeconomic distortions and 
macroeconomic disequilibria, the public sector deficit was the foremost problem. An increase 
in taxes and a drastic cut in Government expenditures were the first actions that helped 
reduce the fiscal deficit. Expenditures on civil servants' salaries were reduced by more than 
30 percent in four years, as public sector employment was cut by a third (100,000 jobs). 
Furthermore, from the very outset of the new administration, the government required its 
agencies to reduce their headcount by 20 percent, discontinued all fund transfers to most 
public firms, did away with discriminatory rules favoring public institutions (basically the 
Civil Service) and increased prices of public services markedly. Simultaneously, the new 
government deregulated most of the previously controlled prices (out of 3,000 initially price-
controlled commodities, only 30 were left by 1975), reduced import tariffs from 103% to 
10% and implemented a tax reform. 
 
Regarding labor, in 1973 and for the following six years, unions were banned and collective 
bargaining was replaced by a government wage setting plan. The crisis and the institutional 
and economic changes rocketed unemployment over 30%. Thus, whilst the law did not 
change, there was a de facto deregulation. In particular, the Ministry of Labor accepted 
“economic reasons” as a justified reason to dismiss workers. The consequence, between 1973 
and 1978 layoffs increased substantially (González, 1996). 
 
After the crisis though, and despite the important recovery of GDP since 1978, the growth of 
employment and wages was slow. Some reasons may be that the tariff reduction policy 
implemented between 1974 and 1979 failed to establish clear objectives in terms of product 
specialization and export orientation (see, Edwards and Edwards, 1987) and that the economy 
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  3did not have the capacity to readjust its human resources to the new skill needs (Paredes and 
Riveros, 1996). However, another explanation for the poor performance in the labor markets 
in late 1970s and early 1980s lies in the rigidities in the market. As a matter of fact, this 
diagnosis produced a major change in individual rights in June 1978, through the enactment 
of the Law Decree 2.200. This ended the requirement to ask for permission to the Ministry of 
Labor in the case of collective (massive) firing something though that in practice was 
generally allowed. Since then, it was allowed firms to dismiss workers for economic needs 
and was not required to have a “just cause” anymore.  
 
In 1979, the new labor code was approved and sweeping reforms were introduced. Among 
the most important was the elimination of national unions in favor of firm level ones. 
Unionization became voluntary and workers' right to strike was curtailed. Striking workers 
could now be replaced from the first day of a strike. All that had clear implications on 
collective bargaining because it had to take place at the firm level. In case of firing workers, a 
limit was set on the severance payment equivalent to 5 months. In addition, in 1980 all 
restrictions on sub contracting ended. Also, in the early 1980s the centralized pension system 
was replaced by a private one, what reduced the social contribution in about 50% (from 30% 
to 20%). 
 
The international crisis of the early 1980s hit Chile in a context where the economy was in a 
weak production and balance of payments position. As a consequence of the early 1980's 
crisis, and without a structural change, the macroeconomic effect on the unemployment was 
huge. The unemployment rate increased from 10.5% in September of 1981 to 24.9% in 
September of 1983 and real wages declined by about 12%. The government reacted with a 
massive temporal emergency employment program.   
 
With the labor reforms, by mid 1980s the government also initiated a massive privatization 
program, which included traditionally state owned enterprises.
4 Also the government 
introduced new rules governing the stock exchange, the insurance industry and mutual funds. 
The new rules sought not only to provide the necessary transparency of transactions, but also 
to ensure adequate portfolio diversification. In fact, there is relative agreement that the first 
privatization stage presented problems mainly because of a lack of regulation (Harberger, 
1985). Likewise, since 1984 a more coherent policy approach relied on the expansion of 
labor-intensive sectors. Fiscal management became even more conservative, shrinking the 
consolidated deficit to zero.
5 
 
In 1990 Chile underwent a new institutional change with the recovery of the democracy. 
However, the basic economic aspects initiated with the mid 1970's reforms were retained, 
especially the macroeconomic policy of the late 1980's. Three governments pertaining to the 
same party coalition successively took office in 1990, 1994 and 2000. A main characteristic 
of these governments is that they kept a basic consensus on the critical role of the private 
sector and of private property, the importance of non discriminatory policies and the use of 
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  4markets to achieve efficiency. These governments, though, attached a much more critical role 
to social policies and were concerned not only with poverty but also with income distribution. 
 
Notwithstanding, in 1991 some changes in the labor law took place. Perhaps the most 
significant was the increase in the limit to severance payment that went from 5 to 11 
months. This amendment in the labor law was considered a final adjustment that would 
validate most previous changes that took place under the military government. This fact, 
more than any other, explains the most impressive increase in foreign investment and the 
sustained growth of about 6 per cent and the rate of unemployment that remained close to 
its natural level until late 1998.
6 However, since 1988, without any structural change, there 
was a macroeconomic downturn in Chile due to two factors: the beginning of the Asian 
crisis and a truly political cyclical period. The second factor was reflected in an important 
relaxation of the fiscal discipline, an impressive increase in the minimum wages, and the 
initiation of a debate about new changes in the labor law, that were finally implemented in 
2002. Since 1998 the unemployment rate jumped and, despite the increase in the GDP, the 
employment and the labor force growth freeze. Regarding this last effect, an important 
controversy emerged in Chile on the reasons behind both the persistence of the 
unemployment and on whether a “discouraged worker effect” explained the labor force 
stagnation.  
 
In short, though we can identify several small changes in between (table 1), we identify five 
distinct periods between 1960 and 2003. The first goes between 1960 and 1973 and is 
characterized by progressive government intervention, not only as a regulator, but as a 
direct employer. The second period goes between 1974 and 1979. In this period no 
collective bargaining was allowed and though formally there were little changes, in practice 
this was a period of de facto deregulation. The third period starts in 1980 and ends in 1990. 
In that period the new labor law applied. The fourth period starts in 1990 with the recovery 
of democracy and with further reforms that suggest a more stable and permanent 
framework, until 1998, when a macroeconomic downturn, and increase in minimum wages 
and the debate of new labor rules initiated in 1998. The last period starts in 1999 and ends 
the fourth quarter in 2003.
7  
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  5Table 1 
Employment Protection Provisions in Chile 
 
 
     Source: Montenegro and Pagés (1999) 
 
 
3. Aggregate Flow and the Probability of Finding a Job 
The diagnosis we can get form a dynamic analysis of the labor market is complementary to 
that provided by cross section surveys. Since Chile has historical data coming from cross 
section surveys, the only way to understand the dynamics of the labor market is using that 
information. Thus, we study the dynamics of Chilean unemployment from the perspective 
of a highly simplified stock-flow model of the labor markets. The data we use comes from 
the unemployment survey of the Universidad de Chile. The survey, which is conducted 
  6quarterly since 1957, consists of repeated cross-sections of the population and provides data 
on stocks of employed, unemployed, and inactive workers.  
 
The dynamics of labor markets economy can help us to understand, for instance, what is the 
probability of finding a job. This probability can be approached by the average duration of 
(interrupted) unemployment. Whilst this information is a biased estimation of expected 
duration, since declared unemployment is interrupted, it provides an idea that the 
probability of finding jobs may change dramatically over the years. Thus, the information 
about unemployment duration, something that has to do with the history on unemployment, 
tells something that the unemployment rate alone does not say. Thus, as apparent from 








To understand the dynamics of the labor markets starting form cross section information, 
we estimate transitions among states, what requires imputing inter-temporal flows among 
states as the difference in stocks, information we do have. In particular, we are interested in 
the states of employment, unemployment and out of the labor force. We initially follow 
Haindl (1985), which combines identities and stock (capital letters) flow (small letters) 










  73.1 The Stock-flow relationships 
 
a) Identities.  
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where D(t) is the number of people unemployed in t, D1(t) is the number of people who is 
searching for jobs for the first time; D2(t) is people who has been unemployed for a quarter; 
and D3(t) is people unemployed for more than a quarter. 
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where f(t) is the net flow into the labor force; f1(t) people in the market for the first time; 
f2(t) people in the market that had participated before.  
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where c(t) is the flow of people hired in t; c1(t) is the flow of hired among those who are 
first time searchers; c2(t) is the flow of hired among those who had lost their jobs before a 
quarter; and c3(t) is the flow of hired among those who were searching for more than a 
quarter. 
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where F(t) is the labor force in t, and E(t) is the employment in t. 
 
 
b) Stock-flow relationships. 
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where d(t) is the flow of people out of the labor force, plus those who were fired in t. 
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  8The problem thus far is that the survey pertains only to unemployment. There is no data 
which describes flows into employment; therefore, the stocks of hires {c1(t), c2(t), c3(t), 
c(t)} are unobserved.  
 
In order to solve the model, it is necessary to determine or assume how the economy 
employs individuals. We follow Haindl (1985) and assume that the stochastic process for 
employment is iid across individuals and has no memory. In any event, this amounts to 
finding the average probability with which an agent is hired, imposing no duration 
dependence on unemployment spells, and assuming there are no differences across 
individuals in the likelihood that they obtain a job offer. Essentially, the model closes by 
replacing actual flows into employment by their expected values. The probability of finding 
a job (within the quarter), if the person is unemployed at the beginning of the quarter, is 
given by pi(t), we can close the model as follows: 
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where pi(t) is given by (14). 
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If people who enter into the labor force for the first time begin searching uniformly 
throughout the quarter, the average search time for them in that quarter is one month and a 
half, and the probability of getting a job during the period of three months p(t), comes from 
. Equation (14) closes Haindl’s model and on the probability pi he 
develops his conclusions on unemployment duration.  
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Instead, we use this probability as an input to estimate the conditional probabilities of 
changing states in a three state model, employed, unemployed, and out of the labor force. In 
the following sub section we use this probability to solve the unknown flow parameters 
{c(t), c1(t), c2(t), c3(t), f(t), f1(t), f2(t), d(t)} in terms of the known stocks {F(t), F(t-1), 
E(t), E(t-1), D1(t), D1(t-1), D2(t), D2(t-1), D3(t), D3(t-1)}. Once the aggregate flow 
parameters have been obtained, we compute the flows across the three possible states, fij(t), 
the flow from individuals that were in state i at time (t-1) and who are in  state j at time t. 
 
 
3.2 Computation of Inter State Flows and Transition Probabilities 
Once the model above is solved for aggregate flow parameters, it is possible to compute the 
expected flows across the different states. Let fij(t) denote the flow into state j at time t of 
those people who were in state i at time (t-1). These flows can be computed from the stocks 
of people in different states and the aggregate flows computed in the previous sections.  
  9 
People who enter the labor force either go directly into employment or are unable to secure 
a job and become unemployed. Flow into employment is given by the fraction of first time 
searchers who are able to find a job within the period in which they enter the labor force. 
That is, 
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Flow into unemployment is the sum of first time searchers who do not obtain a job in their 
first period of search and of other labor force veterans, currently out of the labor force, who 
express a desire to work x(t)
8: 
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Workers in the labor force are re-shuffled between employment and unemployment. A 
fraction of workers who lose their job are able to find a new job within that same period. 
Flow into unemployment is, then composed of people who are either fired or quit their 
jobs: 
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The unemployed who flow into employment (18) consist of the new hired who were 
unemployed for more than a quarter; a proportion of those first time searchers who were 
unable to secure a job initially, the fraction of fired individuals who become employed 
within their first period of unemployment, and a fraction of the net flow of workers 
previously out of the labor force (but only if net flow is positive).  
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Finally, the flow out of the labor force comes either from unemployment or employment. 
These two flows are computed as residual flows; that is, the flow that generate the observed 
change in the stock of unemployed and employed workers. Therefore, flow out of the labor 
force from unemployment is given by: 
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while flow from employment to out of the labor force is given by 
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From these flows, we can compute the average transition probabilities as in (21), where 
each element p(ij) gives the (conditional) probability of going from state i to state j. For 
example, peu denotes the probability that an individual will be unemployed in period t, 
given that was employed in period t-1. 
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where Si(t-1) is the stock of individuals in state i at time (t-1). 
 
Notice that transition probabilities are conditional probabilities. That is, they tell us the 
probability of ending up in a particular state, conditional on starting out in a particular state. 
Conditional probabilities inform us much more than non conditional ones. For instance, 
p(e,u) is the probability of becoming unemployed, given that the person was employed in 
the previous quarter. That is different than the probability of becoming unemployed 
computed from first time searchers only (pou), the probability of remaining unemployed 
(puu) and the probability of being observed in the unemployment state (puu+pou+peu).
9 
 
The results of the Markov matrix built from the different pij, are reported in table 2, and 
visually in figure 2.  
 
Table 2 
Average Transition Probabilities by period 
 
Peu Peo Pue Puo Poe Pou Pee Puu Poo
1962-1973 2,50% 1,02% 61,88% 20,22% 0,28% 2,04% 96,53% 25,91% 97,68%
1974-1979 4,79% 1,25% 39,33% 16,65% 0,34% 2,97% 93,97% 48,23% 96,69%
1980-1990 5,33% 1,56% 49,15% 15,13% 0,32% 3,28% 93,12% 40,98% 96,41%
1991-1998 3,86% 1,80% 77,73% 14,27% 0,50% 2,34% 94,33% 16,55% 97,16%
1999-2003 6,69% 2,12% 58,16% 3,81% 0,41% 1,43% 91,18% 40,62% 98,16% 
 
The changes in different transition probabilities suggest what today is well known: 
employment became less secure since 1974, when Chile experienced the main change in 
their economic orientation and in particular, Courts ended in practice with employment 
rigidity. For instance, the probability for an employed person of becoming unemployed 
(Peu) almost doubled from 2.5% before 1974 to 4.79% in the 1974-1979 period. An 
exceptional period seems to be 1991 – 1998. Despite a more rigid labor law, the 
probabilities changed suggesting even larger labor mobility and in particular, a clear 
reduction of the probabilities of remaining unemployed. This situation can be explained in 
part by the increase in labor demand, which in turn followed a persistent increase in the 
GDP. However, at the same time, whilst this change in the labor law was in fact something 
that could make the labor market more rigid, it represented an improvement in the 
expectations of firms, since all the new government coalition parties had criticized the 
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conditional on staying in the labor force as, peu* = pue / (peu+puu), which tells the probability that a person 
becomes unemployed, but stays looking for a job.  
 
 
  11changes in the Labor Code. Thus, with the return of democracy in 1990, many expected a 
return to the old Labor Code of the 1973, something which did not occurred.  
 
In turn, there was an important reversal of these probabilities since 1999. Besides the 
international crisis that hit the Chilean economy, between 1998 and 2001 the minimum 
wage was increased over 30%, and new more rigid labor regulations were discussed and 
implemented. In this period, all the probabilities showing that the economy was providing 
less and more insecure employment, and hence, the probability to remain employed felt and 








Due to the important jump in the open unemployment, a debate emerged. Two sources of 
data with somewhat different evolution of the main market labor indicators, the official 
information and that generated by the University of Chile, provided some of the basis of the 
debate. One of the hypotheses about the unemployment evolution had to do with the 
  12“discouraged” versus the “added worker” effects on the labor force. The probability of 
leaving the work force, given one was unemployed the previous period (Puo), tells us about 
the discouraged worker effect, whilst Pou, and Poe, tell us about the added worker effect. 
Table 2 suggests that whilst these magnitudes remained quite stable in the different periods 
considered, except in the most recent one, after 1998. In that period the evidence shows that 
Puo felt form 14% to less than 4%, suggesting that the discourage worker effect didn’t 
existed. The evidence also goes against the added worker effect, since Pou and Poe felt to 
their lowest levels.  
 
3.3 Transition Probabilities and the Natural Rate and Length of Unemployment  
From transition probabilities, we can study their effect on the steady state unemployment 
rate and on the expected length on unemployment. To do so, let’s consider the three state 
Markov chain P in which an individual can find himself at anytime, that is, employed, 





= Ρ  
  
Notice that pee + peu + peo = 1, since each individual must end up in some state, regardless 
of the state in which they begin. The Markov chain we study is irreducible, since it consists 
of only one class and all state communicates. If we assume that the transition probabilities 
are known, we can find the invariant distribution that defines the steady state probabilities. 
Let  u e o π π π , , denote the invariant distribution. It turns out that the invariant distribution in 




















1 π  
 
with i, j = o, u, e and S=3. 
 
The invariant distribution must sum to 1 ( 1 = + + u e o π π π ) and the unique invariant 



















  13In a simpler form, these equations state that the unique invariant distribution is also a vector 
of “stationary probabilities”: 
 
X = P’X 
 
Where P’ is the transpose of the transition matrix. The invariant distribution is akin to a 
vector of “steady state” probabilities in the sense that if we start the system out at the 
unique invariant distribution, this distribution will persist over all transitions of the system.  
 
In order to obtain the steady state probabilities, we solve using the four equations above 
along with a set of restrictions of the transition probabilities of the type pii+pij+pik=1, with 
i,j,k all the states.   
 
The invariant distribution for the three state Markov chain model of the labor market is 
given by:  
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Closely related with these values, an interesting question pertains to the duration of 
unemployment, we show in table 3 together with the invariant probabilities of the three 
states, we can interpret as equilibrium rates of unemployment, employment and out of the 
labor force. Assuming that the employment process of a particular individual begins in the 
employment state, the expected number of transitions until de process returns him to that 
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  14Table 3 
Natural Rates of Unemployment,  
(Employment, Out of Labor Force and expected duration) 
 
1962-1973 2,99% 56,03% 40,97% 1,78
1974-1979 7,05% 48,74% 44,22% 2,05
1980-1990 7,12% 51,18% 41,71% 1,95
1991-1998 3,76% 54,87% 41,37% 1,82
1999-2003 5,65% 39,93% 54,41% 2,50




From Table 3 we can notice that whilst the natural rate of unemployment more than 
doubled after the reforms in 1974, it remained high until 1990. Since 1991, it felt 
considerably, however it increased almost two points during the last sub period, when the 
minimum wage increased and the debate on the last reforms took place. The “natural rate of 
employment”, in this last period felt to the lowest historical level, what explains the 
important increase in the number of periods to find a job.  
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Our analysis of the dynamics of labor markets in Chile through a stock flow model 
allows us to understand some key aspects of this market, whose behavior has been in 
some periods puzzling. Mobility and flexibility dramatically increased after the early 
1970s reforms and in particular, with the end of the requirement to fire workers. 
Employment became less secure, but simultaneously, the probability of finding a job 
increased so the net effect on workers welfare might well have been positive.  
 
However, the law tells only part of the story. An exceptional positive period is 1991 – 
1998. Despite a more rigid labor law, the transition probabilities changed suggesting even 
larger labor mobility and in particular, a clear reduction of the probabilities of remaining 
unemployed. Besides the reasons associated with the increase in the GDP, despite the 
change in the labor law that made firing more expensive, it represented an improvement in 
the expectations of firms, in terms that the new law would be consistent and more 
permanent because the legitimacy obtained through an ample consensus. As a matter of 
fact, there was an important reversal of these probabilities since 1999, even before new 
changes in the law took place. In this period and besides the international crisis that hit the 
Chilean economy, between 1998 and 2001 the minimum wage was increased over 30%, 
and new more rigid labor regulations started to be discussed, creating an uncertain 
environment. In this period, all the probabilities showing that the economy was providing 
less and more insecure employment, and hence, the probability to remain employed felt and 
the probability of remaining unemployed more than doubled it previous value.      
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